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Abstract 
 Th is article examines the New Partnership for Africa’s Development initiative launched in 
2001. Th e article discusses the political and economic conjuncture that resulted in the adop-
tion of this initiative. In the main, the analysis demonstrates the ways in which the initiative 
dovetails well with the global neo-liberal project and, consequently, contests the claims by 
African ruling elites and their counter-parts in the global North that it represents a transfor-
mative framework for economic and political change for national social formations in Africa. 
 La globalización y las políticas de cambio en Africa: NEPAD y los fallos del desarrol-
lismo elitista transnacional 
 Este artículo examina la iniciativa de la Nueva Alianza para el Desarrollo de Africa lanzada 
en 2001. El artículo analiza la coyuntura política y económica que resultó de la adopción 
de la iniciativa. En su conjunto, el análisis demuestra la forma en que la iniciativa casa bien 
con el proyecto global neoliberal y, en consecuencia, rechaza la pretensión de las élites afri-
canas y sus contrapartidas en el Norte global. Esta iniciativa representa un esquema trans-
formador para el cambio político y económico en la sociedad africana. 
 Globalisation et politiques de transformation en Afrique: NEPAD et dangers de déve-
loppementalisme d’une élite transnationale 
 Cet article examine le Nouveau Partenariat pour le Développement de l’Afrique, une ini-
tiative lancée en 2001. Cet article parle de la conjoncture politique et économique qui a 
découlé de l’adoption de cette initiative. Dans l’ensemble, cette analyse démontre comment 
cette initiative se raccorde avec le projet global néolibéral et, par conséquent, conteste les 
revendications de l’élite africaine au pouvoir et de ses homologues du Nord. Cette initiative 
procure enﬁ n une structure de transformation économique et politique pour la formation 
nationale et sociale en Afrique. 
 Keywords 
 neoliberalism, development, NEPAD, democracy 
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 Introduction 
 Current discourses on international political economy generally contend 
that the decade of the 1970s generated signiﬁ cant shifts in economic, intel-
lectual and political spheres that continue to shape national and global 
developments. On the economic level, these discourses claim that the 
period saw the emergence of a serious global recession characterized by 
decline in production, high inﬂation, crisis of proﬁ ts for the majority of 
ﬁ rms, technological developments, rise in government deﬁ cits and massive 
layoﬀs for workers. Th ese economic developments and major changes in 
the political landscape of major countries in the global North in the late 
1970s and early 1980s – the rise of Margaret Th atcher in the UK, Helmut 
Kohl in Germany and Ronald Reagan in the United States – and intellec-
tual shifts that called for the dismantling of the global Keynesian economic 
framework are highlighted as core factors that ushered in a new phase of 
globalization underpinned by neo-liberal economic discourse. 
 In the context of African countries, analysts argue that these global eco-
nomic, political and intellectual shifts have had a signiﬁ cant inﬂuence on 
the continent’s development process. In the economic realm, for instance, 
the core features of the neo-liberal economic globalization are said to have 
contributed to an economic downward spiral in most African countries. 
Th ese countries, however, are not the only ones that have faced major eco-
nomic crisis, for as John Rapley has argued, the crisis of capital accumula-
tion has been a core feature of the current phase of globalization in all parts 
of the world.1 In essence, the onset of this phase of globalization marked 
the end of the post-1945 ‘golden age’ of global capitalism which had seen 
signiﬁ cant economic growth in the global North and various parts of the 
global South. In Africa, the crisis of postcolonial capitalism was character-
ized by a serious economic crisis, evidenced by decline in economic  surplus, 
levels of investment and savings, inability of African states to meet their 
debt obligations to public and private lenders, and failure of these states to 
maintain what Yusuf Bangura has termed the post-colonial social contract.2 
 Th e developments that emerged globally in the 1970s have, over the 
years, seen states institute various economic and political strategies in 
eﬀorts to address the economic crises and other contradictions generated 
1)  Rapley 2004. 
2)  For detailed discussions of the various elements of this crisis see, Ihonvbere 2000; 
Bangura 1992. 
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by neo-liberal globalization. Th is paper’s objective is to examine the ways 
in which African states have responded to neo-liberal globalization, with a 
speciﬁ c focus on their New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
initiative. Th e underlying argument of the paper is that African states, like 
other states elsewhere, have not been bystanders in the evolution of the 
contemporary phase of globalization and other global shifts that character-
ize the current global conjuncture. Situating my arguments within the 
critical international political economy intellectual tradition,3 the paper 
argues that the launching of NEPAD demonstrates the political agency of 
these states but contends that their agency is mediated by local and global 
factors and thus challenges the dominant theoretical perspectives to stud-
ies on African states especially the neoliberal approach that tends to repre-
sent their agency as unfettered in the current phase of globalization. Th e 
paper has three sections. In eﬀorts to contextualize the discussion on 
NEPAD section one highlights the ways in which the constitutive ideas 
framing neo-liberal economic globalization shaped Africa’s development 
discourse in the pre-NEPAD era. Section two critically examines the core 
features of the NEPAD initiative while section three demonstrates the 
limitations of the initiative as a blueprint for Africa’s development in the 
contemporary phase of the historical process of globalization. 
 Contexualizing NEPAD: Neo-liberal Globalization and the 
Emergence of a New Development Discourse in Africa 
 Over the last two decades, the emergence and evolution of neo-liberal glo-
balization has greatly shaped Africa’s economic and political processes. On 
the economic front, this development has seen the rise of a new develop-
ment paradigm that borrows heavily from the constitutive ideas that 
underpin global neoliberalism, such as calls for a limited role of the state 
in the economic arena, cuts in social spending, valorization of private cap-
ital and the promotion of international free trade. In speciﬁ c terms this 
discourse has explained Africa’s economic crisis and stagnation as being a 
result of the state’s extensive role in economic aﬀairs, especially through 
3)  Here I am referring to the following texts that use a Neo-Gramscian political economy 
approach to study state formation and shifts in global capitalism among other political 
economy related issues. See: Cox 1987; Robinson 2004; Gill 1993, 1997. 
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the expansion of publicly owned enterprises in the postcolonial period.4 
Other contributing factors to the continent’s economic crisis as articulated 
by advocates of neo-liberal restructuring are extensive trade protection 
measures, such as high tariﬀs and licensing procedures, and overvalued 
currencies. In addition, agricultural policies, especially the practice of pay-
ing small-scale producers limited returns for their products and the decline 
of agricultural exports in the 1970s, are also highlighted as contributing to 
economic stagnation and crisis. Th e expenditure patterns followed by 
postcolonial governments of providing subsidies in agriculture and in 
social sectors such as education and health, and the expansion of the civil 
service are also highlighted as factors. 
 With the rise of a neo-liberal development paradigm and in response to 
the serious economic crisis that came to a head in most African countries 
in the late 1970s, African states have, over the last two decades, imple-
mented core elements of the neo-liberal economic globalization agenda. In 
line with neo-liberal development thought these states, at serious cost to 
many people, especially women and children, have cut spending in various 
social sectors. In the health sector for instance, neo-liberal reforms that call 
for the introduction of a market-based approach to health service provi-
sion have resulted in increases in health costs – a process that has, in the 
case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, seen a decline in women seek-
ing prenatal care and hospital visits for young children.5 Neo-liberal 
reforms have also been implemented in education, a development that has 
facilitated the deepening of the gender gap that has historically existed in 
this sector.6 Other reforms have included layoﬀs of public sector workers 
in the eﬀort to achieve what various reports from the World Bank on Africa 
term as the ‘rationalization’ of the civil service.7 
 Privatization of publicly owned enterprises is another element of neo-
liberal economic reform. As African countries entered a period of serious 
economic crisis, their reliance on public enterprises as engines of economic 
growth came under heavy criticism by scholars working within the new 
development paradigm of neoliberalism and the international  lending 
4)  World Bank 1981, p. 37. 
5)  Turshen 1994, p. 81. 
6)  For extended discussion on the impact of neo-liberal based reforms on the education 
sector in various African countries see, Tsikata and Kerr 2000. 
7)  For seminar reports from the World Bank on neo-liberal restructuring in Africa see 
World Bank 1981, 1989, 1994. 
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community and its leading institutions such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. According to supporters of neoliberal eco-
nomic reforms, public enterprises were largely responsible for the African 
continent’s limited development and economic crisis because they were 
ineﬃcient, created rent-seeking opportunities, and stiﬂed the entrepre-
neurial spirit. 
 Th ese core measures of neo-liberal economic restructuring described 
above were by the late 1980s deemed inadequate for the transformation of 
African economic development along modern capitalist lines.  Consequently, 
by the late 1980s, advocates of the neo-liberal development paradigm 
begun to call for reforms in Africa’s political arena. As a World Bank semi-
nar report declared in 1989, the economic problems of the continent were 
also due to political practices: “Underlying the litany of Africa’s develop-
ment problems is a crisis of governance. . . . [a] deep political malaise [that] 
stymies action in most countries.”8 Th e discourse on political reforms 
highlighted the lack of good governance frameworks as a factor that had 
led to economic crisis, extensive personalised forms of rule, human rights 
abuses, and limited foreign investment, due to an ineﬃcient judiciary that 
had failed to “protect property and enforce contracts.”9 
 Th is trend, according to this line of thought, also led to high levels of 
corruption, waste and lack of economic development in most of Africa. 
Th us, according to advocates of good governance, changes to regime struc-
tures were necessary for the economic and political recovery of the conti-
nent. By the late 1980s, the debate on political reforms had evolved beyond 
calls for good governance practices to include the promotion of the estab-
lishment of multiparty democratic states. In contrast to their earlier devel-
opment paradigm, which supported the establishment of ‘development 
dictatorships’ in the periphery, their new discourse no longer upheld dicta-
tors and their authoritarian strong-arm regimes as the foundation for eco-
nomic development. Consequently, multiparty democracy (along with 
other terms such as governance, human rights and free markets) in Africa 
and other parts of the global South occupied a prominent place in the 
development discourse of the international lending community who 
utilised foreign aid as a powerful tool in the push for its establishment. 
 While the global elite driven twin project of promoting market-led capi-
talism and democracy in Africa in this era of globalization continued to 
8)  World Bank 1989, p. xii. 
9)  World Bank 1989, p. 9. 
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shape development discourse in Africa and elsewhere in the global South, by 
the late 1990s this project was increasingly being challenged from various 
sites. In the main, for analysts of Africa’s development, the nirvana that 
advocates of the neo-liberal development model had promised had not 
emerged. Instead study after study of Washington Consensus policies in 
Africa demonstrated the failure of these policies as a model for equitable and 
democratic development. As one analyst has stated: 
 the anticipation [economic recovery and development] proved to be false. Balance-
of-payments gaps were often narrowed, but by less than expected and only temporar-
ily. Th e beneﬁ ts of reforms were often overwhelmed by the eﬀects of adverse external 
shocks-like the collapse of export prices. New investment failed to appear. Indeed, the 
demand-restraint policies encouraged by the IMF depressed investment instead of 
increasing it, and many African economies continued to stagnate in the 1980s.10 
 Th ese sentiments were expressed in various reports by the Economic Com-
mission for Africa (ECA), in one of which was stated: 
 Economic turnaround had not occurred in almost all of the countries that had tried 
SAPs . . . Even the countries that followed adjustment programmes with the most rigor 
were barely holding their ground. Most were suﬀering further set-backs including 
high inﬂation, lower spending on health, education, housing, sanitation and water. 
Also, laying oﬀ people from their jobs or the declining real wages caused suﬀering to 
reach unbearable proportions.11 
 Th e evident failure of the neo-liberal development model did not deter its 
advocates from claiming that this model had beneﬁ ted African societies 
especially the poor. For the World Bank for instance,
the poor are mostly rural, and as producers, they tend to beneﬁ t from agricultural, 
trade and exchange rate reforms . . . As consumers, both the urban and the rural poor 
tend to be hurt by rising food prices. But adjustment policies have seldom had a major 
impact on food prices in either the open or the parallel market, which supplies most 
of the poor.12
Th is claim contradicts empirical evidence from various parts of Africa and 
the fact that most of the IMF riots in the continent whether in Zambia, 
10)  Lancaster 1993, p. 16. 
11)  Minter 1992, p. 16. 
12)  Quoted in Bond 2001. 
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Sudan or Tunisia emerged following the hiking of food prices due to other 
Washington Consensus policies of currency devaluation and cutting food 
subsidies. It is in the context of increasingly local and global (the anti-
globalization riots in Settle among others) discontent with neo-liberal eco-
nomic restructuring that African states emerged with the NEPAD initiative 
that they claimed would led not only to economic recovery but to an Afri-
can Renaissance characterized by sustainable economic growth and demo-
cratic politics. It is to a discussion of NEPAD I turn to next. 
 Response to Neo-liberal Globalization: African States’ NEPAD 
Initiative 
 Th e New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) emerged in 
October 2001 when African Presidents launched it at the Organization of 
African Unity (now African Union) meeting in Abuja.13 Prior to this 
launch, however, African citizens had not heard of this initiative. African 
elites especially Th abo Mbeki had consulted widely with global North 
political elites such as Tony Blair and had presented a draft version of 
NEPAD (New African Initiative) to G8 leaders at their meeting in Genoa 
in July 2001. 
 Th e NEPAD initiative outlines what it conceives as the origins of Afri-
ca’s underdevelopment and oﬀers an economic and political roadmap 
geared to addressing the continent’s perpetual crisis of development and 
“exclusion in a globalising world.”14 Th e document highlights ﬁ ve develop-
ments as being the sources of Africa’s underdevelopment. First, it claims 
that the evolution of the global economic system has resulted in Africa 
being relegated to the role of producing primary commodities for interna-
tional markets and as a reserve for cheap labour. Th is global division of 
labour has contributed greatly to the continent’s economic stagnation 
since, “of necessity, [it] has meant the draining of Africa’s resources rather 
than their use for the continent’s development. . . . Th us, Africa remains the 
poorest continent despite being one of the most richly endowed regions of 
the world.”15 
13)  NEPAD 2001. 
14)  NEPAD 2001, p. 1. 
15)  NEPAD 2001, p. 5 
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 Second, the document argues that the nature of colonial economic and 
political structures laid the foundation that would haunt the continent’s 
development for a long time. Th e era of European colonialism led to the 
deepening of the continent’s integration into the global system on unequal 
terms as mainly a producer of primary commodities for the industrial 
needs of the colonizing powers, and to the establishment of weak state 
structures. In the main,
colonialism subverted hitherto traditional structures, institutions and values or made 
them subservient to the economic and political needs of the imperial powers. It also 
retarded the development of an entrepreneurial class, as well as a middle class with 
skills and managerial capacity.16 
Th ird, postcolonial political and economic developments did not usher in 
a new period of democratic and sustained economic growth. According to 
NEPAD, 
 At independence, virtually all the new states were characterised by a shortage of skilled 
professionals and a weak capitalist class, resulting in a weakening of the accumulation 
process. Post-colonial Africa inherited weak states and dysfunctional economies, 
which were further aggravated by poor leadership, corruption and bad governance in 
many countries. Africa’s experience shows that the rate of accumulation in the post-
colonial period has not been suﬃcient to rebuild societies in the wake of colonial 
underdevelopment, or to sustain improvement in the standard of living. Th is has had 
deleterious consequences on the political process and led to sustained patronage and 
corruption.17 
 Fourth, while emphasising the role of local historical conditions in facili-
tating dependency and the emergence of undemocratic and weak states, 
the document argues that international conditions in the immediate post-
colonial era were no less important. In particular, “the divisions caused by 
the Cold War hampered the development of accountable governments 
across the continent.”18 Fifth, even after twenty years of neo-liberal reforms, 
the document declares that the fundamental characteristics of African 
states remain: weak, underpinned by corruption and patronage and thus “a 
major constraint on sustainable development.” According to NEPAD, 
while the neo-liberal economic restructuring of the 1980s–90s was meant 
16)  NEPAD 2001. 
17)  NEPAD 2001, pp. 5–6. 
18)  NEPAD 2001, p. 5. 
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to reconstitute African political economies, leading them to a dynamic 
capitalist path, it did not lead to a fundamental shift in the continent’s 
economic structures thus there remains an
urgent need to implement far-reaching reforms: Structural adjustment programmes . . . 
provided only a partial solution. Th ey promoted reforms that tended to remove seri-
ous price distortions, but gave inadequate attention to the provision of social services. 
Consequently, only a few countries managed to achieve sustainable higher growth 
under these programmes.19 
 Architects of NEPAD do not stop at articulating the historical develop-
ments that have generated obstacles for the continent’s development, they 
are keenly looking forward and asking, “What is to be done?” – to borrow 
a pertinent phrase from Vladimir Lenin. On this front they see the current 
phase of globalization as oﬀering an opening not only for the continent’s 
economic development, but also for it to join and take on an important 
role in the ‘global body politic.’ So what is to be done for African countries 
to make a sound transition to capitalist modernity? According to NEPAD 
the measures that are needed to address the continent’s underdevelopment 
encompass reforms in the economic and political arena and the formation 
of  ‘a new partnership’ between African states and their global North coun-
terparts. Th e NEPAD initiative proposes several economic and political 
measures to facilitate not only Africa’s economic recovery but also the 
emergence of sustainable economic growth. Here we concentrate on four 
measures that NEPAD’s advocates claim will lead to a new era in Africa’s 
development. 
 A ﬁ rst measure is a rethinking of the continent’s integration into the 
global system in the contemporary phase of globalization. For African 
political elites, African countries can beneﬁ t from developments generated 
by neo-liberal globalization such as new technologies and economic pro-
duction methods. In order for this to happen they argue that the integra-
tion of Africa countries need to be rethought since it has historically 
generated inequality. In their view, what is needed is a new integration 
framework that views this process from a global interdependence perspec-
tive. Such an approach to global integration would take as its starting point 
the reality of “global interdependence with regard to production and 
demand, the environmental base that sustains the planet, cross-border 
19)  NEPAD 2001. 
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migration, [and] a global ﬁ nancial architecture that rewards good socio-
economic management.”20 
A second measure, which in a way derives from NEPAD’s call for an 
interdependence approach to globalization, is the redeﬁ nition of the 
relationship between African states and their global North counterparts, 
which NEPAD argues has historically been marked by inequality due to 
the global power asymmetry that has characterized the evolution of the 
global system. For African states, what is needed is ‘a new partnership’ 
between African countries, the global North and the leading global gov-
ernance institutions. In this respect, such a partnership would require 
the global North “to reverse the decline in ODA ﬂows to Africa and to 
meet the target level of ODA ﬂows equivalent to 0.7 per cent of each 
developed country’s gross national product (GNP) within an agreed 
period.”21 Further, the partnership would involve a more progressive 
approach to addressing development problems generated by the debt 
overhang that most African countries face, by having countries in the 
global North and multilateral institutions increase “aid ﬂows [that would] 
be used to complement funds released by debt reduction for accelerating 
the ﬁ ght against poverty.”22 In addition, this new partnership would seek 
to address the unequal nature of the contemporary international trading 
system by having global North countries admitting goods from African 
countries to their markets and seeking “more equitable terms of trade for 
African countries within the WTO multilateral framework.”23 Last but 
not least, this partnership would see African political elites working col-
laboratively with their counterparts in the North in eﬀorts to push and 
encourage private capital involvement in African countries with the 
World Bank and other international ﬁ nancial institutions playing a cen-
tral role in this process.24 
 Taking ‘ownership’ of the development process by African peoples and 
their leaders is a third measure proposed by NEPAD advocates. In this 
regard, NEPAD declares that a time has come for Africans to be agents 
of their own destiny and to “understand that development is a process 
of empowerment and self-reliance” which requires that Africans “not be 
20)  NEPAD 2001, p. 8. 
21)  NEPAD 2001, p. 53. 
22)  NEPAD 2001, p. 54. 
23)  NEPAD 2001, p. 53. 
24)  NEPAD 2001, pp. 53–54. 
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wards of benevolent guardians” but “the architects of their own sustained 
upliftment.”25 Th is spirit of ownership, argue African ruling elites, is 
embodied in NEPAD, for the initiative “centres on African ownership and 
management of its development process including its relationship with the 
global North.” For these elites the NEPAD initiative is a bold turn in their 
development thinking as it represents their ﬁ rst step in taking responsibil-
ity for the continent’s development. For them NEPAD is their pledge 
 [it is] based on a common vision and a ﬁ rm and shared conviction, that they have a 
pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and 
collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development . . . an agenda for the 
renewal of the continent. Th e agenda is based on national and regional priorities and 
development plans that must be prepared through participatory processes involving 
the people.”26 
 A fourth measure is the Peace, Security, Democracy and Political Governance 
Initiatives that is aimed at the promotion of democracy, good governance 
and peace. While the various components of this initiative are all impor-
tant, here we will highlight the core elements of the Democracy and Politi-
cal Governance Initiative since it takes centre stage in the NEPAD 
framework. Like the transnational lending community, the architects of 
NEPAD claim to strongly endorse political reforms. In this respect, Afri-
can rulers claim that they are aware and acknowledge that development 
will only occur in the context of a political framework that embraces 
“democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance.”27 
NEPAD also states that African leaders’ pledge
to respect the global standards of democracy, the core components of which include 
political pluralism, allowing for the existence of several political parties and workers’ 
unions, and fair, open and democratic elections, periodically organized to enable peo-
ple to choose their leaders freely.28 
According to NEPAD advocates, embracing global democratic practices 
and other political reforms is the only political option for African coun-
tries, since with the end of the Cold War the world community will tolerate 
25)  NEPAD 2001, p. 6. 
26)  NEPAD 2001, pp. 1 and 10. 
27)  NEPAD 2001, p. 17. 
28)  NEPAD 2001. 
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nothing else. In this respect they claim that the post-1989 world has seen 
the deﬁ nition of core political concepts such as “democracy and state legit-
imacy” which must now be accompanied by a demonstration of good gov-
ernance, “a culture of human rights and popular participation.” With this 
development African ruling elites claim that they have instituted political 
reforms that are widely “recognized by governments across the world” a 
development that according to them has led key players in the global sys-
tem to view Africa through a new lens as evidenced they claim by develop-
ments such as the following: “Th e United Nations Millennium Declaration, 
adopted in September 2000, conﬁ rms the global community’s readiness to 
support Africa’s eﬀorts to address the continent’s underdevelopment and 
marginalisation.”29  
 NEPAD as a Blueprint for Africa’s Politico-economic Change 
 As the preceding discussion indicates, the central message of the propo-
nents of NEPAD, both on the continent and outside, is that it provides a 
blueprint for Africa’s economic and political transformation that will lead 
to an African Renaissance characterized by sustainable economic growth 
and democratic political practices. But does the NEPAD initiative provide 
an economic and political framework that will facilitate such a renaissance? 
Does the framework represent a transformative move in Africa’s develop-
ment discourse or a consolidation of the contemporary hegemonic neo-
liberal development paradigm with an indigenous imprint? Th e paper 
contends that, as it stands, the NEPAD framework has several limitations 
as a blueprint for political and economic change in Africa. Th ese limita-
tions emerge from: its underestimation of forces that underpin the global 
system; the neo-liberal theory that informs NEPAD’s economic frame-
work; its neglect of the class foundations of African states, and its narrow 
deﬁ nition of democracy. 
 In terms of Africa’s economic development, NEPAD’s discussion on 
the historical origins of the continent’s underdevelopment illuminates an 
important historical development that has had a great inﬂuence on  Africa’s 
development and that challenges the a-historical tendencies of some of 
the dominant approaches in studies of the continent’s political economy. 
To argue, as some analysts do, that the roots of the continent’s economic 
29)  NEPAD 2001, p. 9. 
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stagnation lie in postcolonial patterns of accumulation, especially the 
neo-patrimonial basis of the African state, which it is claimed are the 
“essential operating codes for politics” in the continent, oﬀers only partial 
insights.30 Th e neo-patrimonial foundations of these states have their roots 
in the evolution of colonial political economy whose hallmarks were to 
limit both the emergence of an independent capitalist class not dependent 
on the state for its reproduction, and the development of diversiﬁ ed eco-
nomic structures. NEPAD’s historical approach to the question of under-
development further challenges the hegemonic neo-liberal development 
perspective which considers colonialism and other local-global structural 
and political conditions irrelevant to our understanding of Africa’s devel-
opment crisis. 
 NEPAD’s foregrounding of the historical roots of Africa’s development 
crisis leads to its call for a rethinking of the relationship between African 
countries and the global North. As it astutely argues, this relationship has 
been marked by inequality, with the global North forcing its own develop-
ment visions on African countries and supporting an international economic 
architecture that has continuingly deepened the continent’s marginaliza-
tion. What is needed then, as mentioned earlier, is a new framework that 
outlines responsibilities and obligations for African and global North 
states. Th e call for ‘a new partnership’ may be all very well and good on 
paper, but it reﬂects a major departure from NEPAD’s grasp of the pro-
found ways in which the economic, political and ideological foundations 
that underpin the global system shape Africa’s political and economic 
development. After stating how Africa’s integration into the global system 
has been marked by ‘exclusion,’ NEPAD’s architects now envision a new 
era whereby the modalities of global capitalism can be tamed by a civil 
dialogue and gentlemen’s agreements between African elites and their 
global North counterparts. 
 Th e notion that at this global conjuncture the forces of global capital 
can be persuaded to become partners with African states and contribute to 
the continent’s recovery and development demonstrates the many limita-
tions and contradictions that pepper the NEPAD initiative. For instance, 
the initiative does not explain how the competition that has marked the 
evolution of global capitalism would suddenly not set structural limits for 
Africa’s development, and why forces of global capital would be willing, 
30)  Bratton and Van de Walle 1997, p. 63. 
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given their search for expansion and proﬁ ts, to facilitate the continent’s 
development. Global capitalism involves competition, not only among 
local ﬁ rms, but international ones, and also among nations. As an early 
analyst of the rise of global capitalism astutely observed:
the development of capitalist production makes it constantly necessary to keep increas-
ing the amount of capital laid out in a given industrial undertaking, and competition 
makes . . . competition to be felt by each individual industrial capitalist as external 
coercive laws . . . compels him to keep constantly extending his capital, in order to 
preserve it, but extend he cannot except by means of progressive accumulation.31 
 Th us capitalism as a mode of production remains a spectre of competition 
which continues to incorporate various parts of the world into the global 
capitalist order unevenly and under unequal terms. Consequently, the rhe-
torical of free trade, global village and interdependence notwithstanding, 
the process continues deepening the historical economic divide between 
the global North and global South, a reality that is captured by one of 
NEPAD’s organic intellectuals, Th abo Mbeki, in his constant critique of 
the contemporary global system as being marked by “global apartheid” – a 
system that “has pity neither for beautiful nature nor for living human 
beings.”32 
 NEPAD supporters’ underestimation of how the imperatives of global 
capital limit the emergence of  ‘a new partnership’ between African coun-
tries and the global North, extends to its claim that a partnership can 
emerge between African states and institutions of global governance. As 
mentioned earlier, these supporters claim that the embrace of market-led 
development and good governance measures have resulted in global gover-
nance institutions viewing African countries through a new lens. But the 
empirical evidence stemming from the eﬀorts of global South states and 
civil society actors to craft a civilized dialogue with the global North and 
institutions of global governance demonstrate otherwise and make the 
claims of African states ring hollow. A few examples will suﬃce here. In the 
last decade or so, civil society groups have been involved in a persistent 
struggle for the democratization of leading institutions of global gover-
nance to address what they deem as a serious case of  ‘democratic deﬁ cient’ 
31)  Marx 1961, p. 592. 
32)  Mbeki 2002. 
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in the way these institutions are governed.33 In addition, the promotion of 
“unregulated economic globalization” by these institutions, a process that 
is generating deep social dislocations, is another source of discontent 
between these institutions and groups in civil society.34 
 It is important to note the nature of civil society’s engagement with 
leading international institutions varies depending on the institution, the 
nature of issues that frame the dialogue and the global political conjunc-
ture. In the speciﬁ c case of the World Trade Organization’s involvement 
with transnational civil society, the process has been generated through 
major critiques by groups in transnational civil society and intellectuals 
who have highlighted the asymmetrical nature of the international trading 
regime. From its establishment in the immediate post-1945 period, this 
regime has served and reﬂected the needs and interests of dominant trans-
national interests drawn mainly from the industrialized North at the 
expense of countries in the developing world. Th us, contemporary chal-
lenges presented by transnational civil society to the WTO – from the 
ministerial meetings in Singapore and beyond – have a long history, but 
the intensity of the undemocratic and unjust nature of this international 
trading regime has been shaped by the nature of the current stage of 
globalization. 
 Since its inception in 1994 the World Trade Organization has used an 
inclusion/exclusion strategy in its involvement with transnational civil 
society. Th e founding moment of the WTO’s strategy with transnational 
civil society was in 1996, when the institution issued guidelines that were 
to govern its relationship with this community. Th e six guidelines stipu-
lated that ﬁ rst, the WTO’s association with non-state actors was to be at 
the ‘discretion of the organization, and the latter would only be involved 
in a dialogue with non-state actors who showed ‘concern’ with the central 
issues of the WTO.35 Second, non-state actors involved in the dialogue 
had to play an important role in disseminating information about the 
WTO; and third, the latter would become more transparent by making its 
documents increasingly available on its website.36 Th e fourth guideline 
spelled out speciﬁ c ways in which the relationship between the WTO and 
33)  Beetham 1998, p. 67. 
34)  Murphy 2000, p. 789. 
35)  Wilkinson 2005, p. 163. 
36)  Wilkinson 2005, p. 163. 
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non-state actors would develop mainly through the WTO’s organized 
“issue-speciﬁ c symposia.”37 Fifth, WTO staﬀ who participated in dialogues 
with non-state actors would do so in a ‘personal’ capacity.38 Th e last guide-
line stipulated that “under no circumstances” would non-state actors be 
engaged in “the work of the WTO or its meetings.”39 Th e preceding clearly 
indicates the limited room for maneuver for transitional civil society actors 
in their engagement with the WTO. What has occurred since the estab-
lishment of the guidelines is that non-state actors whose agenda is closer to 
that of the WTO are legitimized and those that raise questions are dele-
gitimized. Global political shifts that have emerged post-September 11 
have also tempered criticism of the organization, thus giving it no incen-
tive to engage in institutional reforms.40 
 Th e other global institutions, the World Bank and the IMF, have also 
increasingly adopted the strategy of engaging transnational civil society. 
Th ese two institutions have been criticized mainly for their lack of account-
ability and their endorsement of global neoliberalism. In terms of repre-
sentation, countries that have what Ngaire Woods terms the most ‘intensive’ 
relationship with these organizations are inadequately represented on their 
Executive Boards.41 In the context of representation in these two institu-
tions, African countries are the most underrepresented. For example, “Th e 
21 anglophone members of the IMF, 11 of whom have ‘an intense’ rela-
tionship with the IMF, are represented by one Executive Director.”42 Th e 
same countries, including the Seychelles, are represented by one Executive 
Director at the World Bank. Th is power asymmetry has led transnational 
civil society to call for reforms in the structure of these two institutions. 
Th e IMF and the World Bank have in the past few years opened up spaces 
for dialogue with transnational civil society. Both institutions have made 
attempts to provide information on their activities and to hold biannual 
meetings with some members of transnational civil society. While these 
eﬀorts mark a signiﬁ cant development given the history of secrecy in these 
institutions, it would be naïve to think that their practices will become 
democratic in the near future. As Ngaire Woods declares, even with recent 
37)  Wilkinson 2005, p. 163. 
38)  Wilkinson 2005, p. 165. 
39)  Wilkinson 2005, p. 165. 
40)  Wilkinson 2005, p. 170. 
41)  Woods 2001, p. 84. 
42)  Woods 2001, p. 85. 
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developments, non-state actors “have not taken a place as major ‘stake-
holders’ in the institutions: they have not acquired control, nor a formal 
participatory role in decision-making.”43 
 Lest we repeat the analytical errors of scholars who place the problems 
of creating ‘a new partnership’ for Africa’s development on the shoulders of 
external forces, it is important that we explore the reasons underpinning 
African states’ claim that ‘a new partnership’ is possible between them and 
the dominant forces that shape the global system. While not denying that 
African states, like other states elsewhere, have to ﬁ nd ways to solve or 
contain accumulation crises and other issues of development, we contend 
that the issue at hand for these states is how to achieve political legitimacy 
both internally and externally, given the serious crisis of legitimacy they 
have had to contend with from the late 1970s due to internal and global 
developments. In the main, African political elites are aware that ﬁ nding a 
solution for the continent’s development crisis at this current global con-
juncture calls for the embrace of neo-liberal thinking and practice. Th us 
for African states the era of seeking development paths that diverge from 
the global norm as epitomized by Julius Nyerere or Th omas Sankara in an 
earlier period is deemed as gone. What has emerged in Africa in the era of 
NEPAD is that the leading lights of this initiative “talk left and walk right” 
as  Patrick Bond has argued in various works. Mbeki’s scathing critiques of 
market-led development – e.g., “Th e critically important task to end the 
poverty and underdevelopment, in which millions of Africans are trapped, 
inside and outside our country, cannot be accomplished by the market. If 
we were to follow the prescriptions of neo-liberal market ideology, we 
would abandon the masses of our people to permanent poverty and under-
development” while referring to himself as a Th atcherite44 – exemplify the 
phenomenon that Bond articulates. Th e fact of the matter is that, given 
the nature of the current global conjuncture and the social class bases of 
African states, it would be ‘political suicide’ for these states not to embrace 
Lady Margaret Th atcher’s mantra, “Th ere is no alternative” to global neo-
liberalism. Given these political realities it becomes imperative for the Afri-
can states to construct global capitalist expansion as a process that can be 
civilized through the forging of a partnership with the global North and its 
attendant institutions. 
43)  Woods 2001, p. 96. 
44)  Mbekii 2003. 
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 At the local level, African states’ embrace of global neo-liberalism 
through NEPAD has enabled the reproduction of their legitimacy – at 
least for the dominant classes – even though the continent continues on 
the same economic downward spiral that marked its pre-NEPAD era. 
With the launching of NEPAD, African leaders claim that they can deliver 
the long-awaited ‘development cake’ since they ‘own’ the continent’s devel-
opment process. Further, they claim that ‘a new partnership’ with the 
global North has emerged, since their NEPAD initiative has been endorsed 
by leaders of the global North, as evidenced by the enthusiastic support it 
has received from various northern quarters, especially in Canada under 
Prime Jean Chrétien, the G8 meetings in Genoa, the European Union, 
and in Washington, where one commenter stated, “NEPAD is philosoph-
ically spot-on. Th e US will focus on those emerging markets doing the 
right thing in terms of private sector development, economic freedom and 
liberty.”45 How long this transnational elite neo-liberal pact will last is 
diﬃcult to tell, since African states are facing growing anticapitalist and 
anti-globalization social movements. Th e ability of African states to con-
tain these movements, however, cannot be ruled out, given what has gone 
on in Zimbabwe in the last several years and eﬀorts in Malawi to contain 
through punitive laws the agenda of progressive social movements.46 
 Moving beyond the limits of NEPAD’s doctrine of the formation of a 
new partnership, the initiative has other limitations as a blueprint for Afri-
can countries’ politico-economic change. To begin with, its conceptualiza-
tion of capitalist transformation of African countries falls within the same 
narrow parameters advocated by the Washington Consensus. Th e latter 
deems the transition of the continent to capitalist modernity as involving 
merely the introduction of ‘market incentives’ in all the key sectors of the 
economy and limited investment in social sector development. Th is lim-
ited view of social change stems from the ahistorical and reductionist 
nature of the neo-liberal theory of development that underpins NEPAD 
and Washington Consensus development frameworks. Both frameworks 
view the transition of a society to capitalist modernity as a process that 
only requires letting the ‘invisible hand’ of the market determine economic 
and social change. NEPAD’s goes even further and claims that what Afri-
can countries need is ‘far-reaching’ neo-liberal reforms since SAPs did not 
45)  See Bond 2004, p. 15. 
46)  Sahle 2006. 
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go far enough especially in the restructuring of the social service sector 
along market lines. Th at the historical experience of societies that have 
undergone capitalist transformation demonstrates a radical transformation 
of all aspects of society and the centrality of the state in the process is 
ignored by advocates of neo-liberal economic development in Africa and 
elsewhere. As Joseph Stiglitz, a former steward of global neo-liberalism, 
states in a recent forward to Karl Polanyi’s seminal text: 
 Th e advocates of the neoliberal Washington consensus emphasize that it is govern-
ment interventions that are the source of the problem; the key to transformation is 
‘getting prices’ and getting the government out of the economy through privatization 
and liberalization. In this view, development is little more than the accumulation of 
capital and improvements in the eﬃciency with which resources are allocated – purely 
technical matters. Th is ideology misunderstands the nature of the transformation itself – 
a transformation of society, not just of the economy, and a transformation of the 
economy that is far more profound than their simple prescriptions would suggest. 
Th eir perspective represents a misreading of history, as Polanyi eﬀectively argues.47 
 Further, NEPAD’s approach to politico-economic change is deeply reduc-
tionist and leads it, like its Washington Consensus counterpart, to concep-
tualize transition to market-led capitalism as a unilinear process leading all 
societies to the last stage of economic development, as W. Rostow articu-
lated almost ﬁ fty years ago in his ‘stages of growth’ argument.48 Such an 
approach to social change neglects to acknowledge that even the transfor-
mation to capitalism in the global North involved complex social processes 
that took diﬀerent trajectories. European transitions to capitalist moder-
nity, for instance, took various paths, and were highly mediated processes. 
Consequently, in the context of Africa and elsewhere, it would be fruitful 
to think of these processes of social change as being complex and taking 
diﬀerent trajectories. As H. Cardozo and E. Falleto have argued, these 
transformations are mediated by local class structures, cultural practices, 
colonial history, and of course the nature of the global political and eco-
nomic conjuncture.49 Taking such a complex view of politico-economic 
change will not only historicize Africa’s development trajectories, but also 
Europe’s and America’s transformation to their own forms of capitalism. 
47)  Stiglitz 2001, p. xiv. 
48)  Rostow 1960. 
49)  Cardoso and Faletto 1979. 
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Such a development would hopefully contain the simplistic solutions 
oﬀered by global neo-liberal architects and their African counterparts as far 
as Africa’s transformations are concerned. 
 NEPAD’s advocates also misrepresent the transformative potential of 
the social forces closely linked to African states. In essence, their claim that 
African states are committed to leading their societies to a new era of devel-
opment marked by equality and ‘people-centred’ development ignores the 
social bases of these states. Th is approach to African states represents them 
as institutions that ﬂoat above history and class dynamics. In the case of 
the latter, for instance, the class foundations of the initiative were embed-
ded from the beginning, for the process leading to the adoption of the 
NEPAD framework was initiated and framed by members of the  continent’s 
ruling classes. Th roughout the framing process, for instance, civil society 
groups were never consulted. Further, like the architects of earlier and con-
temporary hegemonic theories of development, modernization and neo-
liberalism respectively, proponents of NEPAD consider ruling elites as the 
main agents of social change in Africa. 
 In the political arena NEPAD claims, as mentioned earlier, that the 
continent has entered a new political age marked by democracy, respect for 
human rights, and search for peace. Yet, from Malawi to Nigeria and places 
in between, Africa’s so called democratic regimes have all the markings of 
‘illiberal’ democracies.50 In the case of Nigeria, the return of President 
Obasanjo to oﬃce was characterized by what internal and external observ-
ers termed as ‘massive irregularities.’ Electoral records in the southern River 
State, for instance, indicated “a near 100 per cent turnout with 2.1 million 
of 2.2 million registered voters supporting President Obasanjo,” a result 
that contradicts the low turnout trend recorded by observers in the state; 
and in Obasanjo’s home region he “won 1,360,170 votes against his oppo-
nent’s 680.”51 Confronted with questions about the legitimacy of the elec-
tion results given the irregularities that characterized them, not just in his 
home state but in others as well, President Obasanjo oﬀered a ‘cultural’ 
explanation: “Certain communities in this country make up their minds 
to act as one in political matters. . . . Th ey probably don’t have that kind of 
culture in most European countries.”52 Th ese comments roll oﬀ the tongue 
50)  Zakaria 1997. 
51)  IRIN news service, 12 May 2003 and Mail and Guardian, 26 April 2003, respectively, 
quoted in Bond 2004, p. 18. 
52)  IRIN news service, 12 May 2003. 
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of one of the framers of NEPAD and a self-proclaimed leading force in the 
African Renaissance project. Th e same undemocratic trend and return to 
authoritarian tendencies is also evident in Kenya. In 2006, faced with a 
major political crisis generated by questions surrounding his response to 
corruption in his government with the emergence of Githongo’s report, 
Mwai Kibaki’s regime has returned to the old repressive ways of Kenyatta 
and Moi eras. In the middle of the night in early March, the regime 
had workers of the media outlets of the Th e Standard Group attacked by 
hooded men. During these raids workers at Th e Standard newspapers 
were ordered to lie down by men carrying AK-47s, who went on to burn 
newspapers meant for delivery the following day and arrest three journal-
ists. Yet the regime’s response through its Internal Security Minister, John 
Michuku, was that “the raids were designed to protect state security.”53 
With national and global criticism of this incident and the increasing 
intolerance of independent media and dissent in the country, Kibaki’s 
regime responded by stating that it was committed to the “promotion of 
responsible journalism.”54 
 Th e class bases of African ruling elites’ commitment to democratic pol-
itics and their disrespect of the popular will is also clearly evident in their 
stipulation in the NEPAD blueprint that they hold each accountable for 
the deepening of democracy and other good governance practices. Accord-
ing to NEPAD, this is to be achieved through the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM). Th us far, African leaders have ignored their much-
touted APRM framework. Th e support of Robert Mugabe’s autocratic rule 
in Zimbabwe by Mbeki and other African political elites demonstrates 
how rhetorical their support for democracy and respect for human rights 
is. For several years now Mugabe has consolidated his power in an author-
itarian political structure that has no regard for basic human rights, let 
alone the broader human rights embodied in second and third generation 
human rights discourses. Yet, at the Commonwealth Heads of Govern-
ment meeting, Mbeki had no qualms stating that the push to suspend 
Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth was nothing but sheer racism on the 
part of the leaders of the White Commonwealth. Th is resorting to claims 
of White Commonwealth racist conspiracy ignores facts pertaining to the 
March 2002 presidential elections in Zimbabwe. As various observers have 
53)  BBC news, 2 March 2006 and Th e Standard, 3 March 2006. 
54)  Mutahi Kagwe, Kenya’s Information Minister, BBC news, 2 March 2006. 
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stated, intimidation and other forms of state-sponsored terror character-
ized these elections. According to one report, 
 Th e Presidential election was marred by a high level of politically motivated violence 
and intimidation. . . . We were concerned that the legislative framework within which 
the elections were conducted, particularly certain provisions of the Public Order and 
Security Act and the General Laws Amendment Act, was basically ﬂawed. Limitations 
on the freedom of speech, movement and of association prevented the opposition 
from campaigning freely.55 
 While Mugabe continues to deepen his autocratic rule, his NEPAD col-
leagues are silent or, like Mbeki, claim they believe in “quiet diplomacy.” 
In 2005, for instance, Mugabe continued his policy of gross violation 
of human rights by ordering the destruction of homes of the most mar-
ginalized communities in Harare under his regime, so-called “Operation 
Murambatsvina-Shona” or “drive out trash” campaign. But African elites 
have thus far not called for political sanctions or any other disciplinary 
measure and nor have their global ‘partners’ called for regime in Zimbabwe. 
 Th e emergence of limited forms of democracy is not surprising if one 
takes a careful look at the nature of the democracy that is being promoted 
in the era of neoliberal globalization. Elites drawn from government and 
business sectors are deemed by the transnational lending community to be 
the central players in the establishment of democracy in the developing 
world. As the World Bank declared in 1989, “A common mistake is to 
ignore local leadership, often on the grounds that it is exploitative. . . . On 
the contrary, studies show that working with existing leaders” yields better 
results.56 Th e intellectual origins of the international lending community’s 
democratisation campaign make it clear that underlying the push for 
peripheral democratisation is the stabilisation of the existing economic 
and social system, and hence the interests of capital at both the local and 
international levels.57 In addition, like its view of market economic reforms, 
the community’s view of democratisation in Africa and elsewhere in the 
global South is not that of a historical and social process; rather their idea 
is that as long as there are local elites who are interested in implementing 
procedural democracy, liberal democracy can generally operate. 58
55)  Star, Johannesburg, 31 March 2002. 
56)  Quoted in Sahle (forthcoming). World Bank 1989, p. 61. 
57)  See for example, Huntington 1991. 
58) See Sahle (forthcoming).
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 Concluding Notes 
 Th is paper has attempted to demonstrate the ways in Africa states have 
responded to the current phase of globalization. As the discussion has indi-
cated, these states have been heavily involved in the process and have used 
their political agency in eﬀorts to reproduce themselves given the nature of 
the contemporary global conjuncture. Th e paper has also challenged the 
claims by African states as outlined in the NEPAD initiative and has dem-
onstrated its limitations as a tool for Africa’s transformation along demo-
cratic and equitable lines. Finally the paper has also highlighted how in 
very profound ways the NEPAD initiative represents the recycling of the 
hegemonic neo-liberal development and thus oﬀers not a new start for the 
continent but a deepening of neo-liberal political and economic practices 
in the continent. 
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